Rather than sailing under recognized flag states, many tankers now claim registration with registries that do not exist, have been shut down, or have publicly revoked large numbers of certificates. These vessels are not disappearing from trade. They are remaining active while exploiting gaps between documentation checks, AIS self-reporting, and jurisdictional authority.     The result is a growing population of vessels that appear compliant on the surface but lack the legal foundations that underpin insurance, classification, and enforcement.

As 2025 drew to a close, approximately 285 internationally trading tankers were broadcasting via AIS under the flag of a fraudulent or unknown registry, according to Windward analysis. Windward identified 18 such fraudulent registries, as defined by the International Maritime Organization (IMO). A striking 91% of vessels using these fraudulent registries were already sanctioned by Western authorities, underscoring the increased pressure dark fleet tankers face in finding a legitimate regulatory home to continue trading. The most frequently used fraudulent registries were Guinea (51 ships), Netherlands Antilles (45), Guyana (44), and Aruba (24).

Fraudulent registries persist because the global maritime system has been built to rely heavily on declared information.

AIS broadcasts, paper certificates, and self-reported flag data are often accepted at face value unless something visibly goes wrong. This creates an opening for registries that operate through cloned websites, forged certificates, or unofficial intermediaries. In other cases, vessels continue to claim flags from registries that were dismantled or stripped of international recognition years ago.

For high-risk operators, these registries provide a way to remove accountability without removing visibility. The vessel keeps moving, cargo keeps flowing, and responsibility becomes difficult to assign.

False flagging does not occur in isolation. It sits at the center of a broader shadow fleet ecosystem that includes both sanctioned and pre-sanction risk vessels…False flagging has evolved from an isolated tactic to a structural feature of deceptive shipping networks.   A Windward analysis examined more than 540 tankers and gas carriers linked to Iran-related trade. Nearly 40% were found to be falsely flagged, either by using fraudulent registries or by falsely claiming registration with legitimate flag states, based on International Maritime Organization records. More than 300 of these vessels were already sanctioned by the United States, the United Kingdom, or the European Union. Many were older tankers, averaging 22 years of age, operating without valid insurance or recognized certification once their false flag status was established.   Many of these vessels were already sanctioned, but the larger risk lies beyond enforcement. Once a vessel is falsely flagged, insurance, class certification, and flag-state oversight are effectively void. Yet many of these ships continued operating through major maritime routes, conducting ship-to-ship transfers, manipulating GNSS signals, and cycling through multiple flags in short timeframes.

The result is a growing population of tankers that appear compliant on paper but operate outside the global rules-based order. For compliance teams, insurers, P&I clubs, and port authorities, this creates a dangerous blind spot where documentation can no longer be trusted without independent verification.   This is the hidden threat posed by false flags. They undermine the assumptions that global shipping relies on to manage risk, safety, and accountability.    False flagging is frequently paired with other deceptive shipping practices…False flags weaken the commercial and legal infrastructure that global shipping depends on to function predictably. When a vessel claims a fraudulent or nonexistent registry, the mechanisms that underpin maritime trade begin to fail. Flag-state responsibility becomes unenforceable. Insurance and classification linked to that flag may be invalid, suspended, or impossible to verify. Yet on paper, the vessel can still appear compliant, moving through ports, anchorages, and shipping lanes as part of normal trade.  This creates systemic risk. Commercial counterparties may unknowingly engage with vessels that are effectively uninsured, improperly classed, or outside any clear legal jurisdiction. In the event of an incident, collisions, pollution, cargo loss, or crew injury, liability becomes contested or unassignable, delaying response and shifting costs across the supply chain.

At scale, widespread false flagging erodes confidence in documentation, registries, and compliance processes that global shipping relies on to move safely and efficiently. It increases operational uncertainty, distorts risk pricing, and exposes legitimate operators to cascading consequences from vessels designed to operate without accountability.      Windward enables organizations to replace assumption-based screening with verified maritime intelligence. KYV™ evaluates vessels using behavioral history, ownership structures, sanctions exposure, and registry status to surface identity risk early. Document Validation checks whether flag certificates, registry claims, and voyage paperwork align with authoritative sources. Remote Sensing Intelligence independently confirms where vessels actually operate, exposing false flags, AIS spoofing, and identity manipulation even when cooperative systems appear clean.

Together, these capabilities allow regulators, insurers, and compliance teams to act before exposure becomes liability.  They undermine insurance coverage, distort risk pricing, weaken port state control, and allow sanctions evasion networks to scale. As enforcement pressure grows, registry fraud is accelerating rather than receding.   Addressing this threat requires verifying identity, behavior, and documentation together. Without that, fraudulent registries will continue to hollow out global maritime governance from within.